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Abstract
Is the privately optimal quit rate too high or too low? Since quits impose 
negative externalities on employers due to hiring costs and delays and 
training costs one might expect the privately optimal quit rate to be 
higher than socially optimal. In particular one might expect this to be 
true if laws or social norms rule out contracts in which such externalities 
are internalized - that is contracts in which workers pay firms damages 
when they quit or equivalently post bonds when hired. Interestingly, this 
need not be true since firms' optimal response to this problem is to pay 
higher than market clearing wages. This causes involuntary 
unemployment, which in turn means that quits create positive 
externalities for the unemployed. In particular, if there are match 
specific non-pecuniary amenities, workers who dislike their jobs and are 
indifferent between keeping them and quitting may increase average 
utility if they quit. This paper presents examples in which the privately 
optimal quit rate is lower than the socially optimal quit rate. Counter­
intuitively, if workers are allowed to commit to paying damages to firms 
when they quit, the privately optimal quit rate increases until it equals 
the socially optimal quit rate. The possibility that privately optimal quit 
rates are lower than socially optimal, suggests an additional rationale for 
unemployment insurance not based on risk sharing or redistribution.






















































































































































































When labour markets are perfectly flexible, theory asserts that 
the matching of workers to jobs is Pareto efficient. It is not possible to 
make two workers better off by giving each the other’s job without 
reducing the profits of one of the employers. Wages reflect the skills of 
workers and the non-pecuniary aspects of jobs. Equally qualified 
marginal workers are indifferent between different jobs. Infra marginal 
workers strictly prefer the jobs they have to any other which might be 
available to them. However, if search is costly or training is firm- 
specific this need not be so ex post. Workers may regret their initial 
choice of jobs and choose to sacrifice their firm-specific human capital 
in order to see if a new job suits them more. This imposes a cost on 
their current employer, which workers may ignore. This tends to 
suggest that if labour markets are perfectly flexible but there is firm- 
specific training, quit rates will be inefficiently high, a subsidy for quits 
will have first order costs and a penalty for quits may reduce dead 
weight losses (Jovanovich [1979], Mortensen [1978]). Indeed 
considerations of this sort led to the introduction of such a penalty in 
the former Soviet Union (see Mamie, [1992]).
In contrast Akerloff, Rose and Yellen ([1988] denoted ARY 
from now on) note that if the labour market does not clear, workers 
may keep jobs which they do not like in order to avoid the risk of 
involuntary unemployment. Dissatisfied workers may quit only if they 
know that there will be vacant jobs. If there is involuntary 
unemployment, quits create positive as well as negative externalities. 
By quitting, a worker makes a job available to an unemployed or 
dissatisfied worker. ARY argue that if there is involuntary 
unemployment, workers will not be efficiently matched to jobs and a 
Pareto improvement may be achieved if workers switch jobs. ARY 
suggest that quit rates might be inefficiently low and that a subsidy to 
quits could be socially beneficial in the sense that it could cause first 
order increases in money metric social welfare.
Their analysis is analogous to earlier work on vacancy rate 
externalities (Diamond [1981]). Diamond assumes full employment 
and an exogenous job separation rate, and considers frictional 
unemployment and vacancy rate externalities caused by match- 
specific moving or training costs. He concludes that (neglecting risk 
aversion and therefore the costs of inequality) the optimal 
unemployment insurance rate may be positive. Since he does not 
consider voluntary quits, he does not consider whether unemployment 




























































































driven by the assumed match-specific start-up costs, which are less 
clearly documented than match-specific non-pecuniary amenities.
In another related article, Diamond and Maskin [1979] describe 
a model of breach of contract clearly related to quits. They assume 
costly search, making their model different from that discussed below. 
They find that the equilibrium search intensities and breach (quit) rates 
may be lower than the socially optimal intensity and breach (quit) rate. 
It is important to note that this result occurs when the matching 
technology is quadratic, but not when it is linear. In other words, it is a 
result of aggregate increasing returns to scale in matching. In the 
model described below, matching is costless and the number of 
matches is the lesser of the number of vacant jobs, and the number of 
involuntarily unemployed workers. This implies that our results are not 
a special case of Diamond and Maskin’s results.
There are certainly search costs and a quadratic matching 
function is at least arguably reasonable. However one may still ask 
whether the result that, if the matching function exhibits constant 
returns to scale (is CRS), the breach (quit) rate is at least as high as 
the social optimum, is robust to modifications of Diamond and Maskin’s 
assumptions. It is particularly striking that we find counter-examples 
to this rule without assuming that the firm can demand to be paid for 
the damage caused by breach of contract (quits), since Diamond and 
Maskin find that, without damages, the breach (quit) rate is 
unambiguously too high if the matching function is CRS.
ARY do not rationalise the assumption of involuntary 
unemployment in their model. While fairly few economists doubt that 
there is involuntary unemployment, the reasons for its existence are 
still a matter for serious concern. It is possible that the mechanism 
which causes involuntary unemployment itself implies that there are 
social costs of reducing unemployment or of increasing turnover which 
could cancel the benefits which ARY note. It is possible that 
involuntary unemployment cannot therefore be eliminated. Hence it is 
worth constructing a formal model which allows for involuntary 
unemployment to assess possible remedies for the problem noted by 
ARY.
Several economists have noted that firm-specific training or 
other costs of turnover can cause involuntary unemployment (Salop 
[1979], Schlicht [1978], Stiglitz [1974]). Firms will wish to reduce 
turnover in order to reduce training costs. One way to do so is to pay 
higher than market clearing wages. Another way is to delay payment 
of wages, to force workers, in effect, to post a bond which is forfeited 




























































































similar idea is the obligation in certain countries to repay scholarships if 
a job in the public sector is not taken. In some cases (for example the 
one described below) delaying wage payments cannot eliminate the 
incentive to pay higher than market clearing wages. Hence involuntary 
unemployment will result unless negative payments are allowed. This 
means that there will be positive externalities from quits, and that 
workers and jobs may be mismatched. Firm-specific training is both 
the clearest reason for quits being inefficient and a potential 
explanation as to why quit rates are too low. Is it then possible for quit 
rates to be inefficiently low in a model which differs from the textbook 
efficient labour market because of firm-specific training? Can allowing 
firms to charge workers a fine when they quit cause increased quit 
rates? The remainder of this paper is devoted to a highly stylised 
example in which the answers to both questions are yes.
The paper has eight sections. Section II presents a simple 
model of turnover efficiency wages in which involuntary 
unemployment is caused by the costs imposed on firms by quits, and in 
which a higher quit rate increases average utility. In section III the 
multiplicity of Nash equilibria of the model is demonstrated. In section 
IV the counter-intuitive effects of allowing workers to contract to pay 
fines if they quit are demonstrated. A slight generalisation is discussed 
in section V. A different model of the cost of turnover is presented in 
section VI. Generalisations are discussed in section VII. Conclusions 
are sketched in section VIII.
II A Simple Model
The model described below has two basic assumptions. First, 
the non-pecuniary amenities of jobs are match-specific and workers 
must work for at least one period to find out how much they like the 
job. Second, jobs require specific training which is not useful for other 
jobs. The basic characteristics of this world are as follows:
Time is discrete and there is an infinite horizon.
Firms. There are many identical firms, each of which employs at 
most one worker. Each firm j produces the same good, the price of 
which is normalised to be one. Firms maximise the expected present 
value of profits.
Workers. Workers are risk neutral and maximise discounted 




























































































1) l/,-£ (1  +
S=t
where u, is equal to c, if the worker is unemployed, and c,+ q,; if 
the worker is employed for %, a match-specific non pecuniary utility 
for worker i in job j which is time invariant. The assumed utility 
function implies that the interest rate is always r. It does not matter to 
workers when they consume.
The benefits of improved matching depends on the upper tail of 
the distribution for q. We will assume that r) has a very fat upper tail. 
Results similar to those presented can occur in more complicated 
models in which more standard distributions for q are assumed, as we 
discuss below. We assume that q is distributed with probability density 
given by
and that for each worker i, the distribution of q„ is independent 
for different firms j, and that for each firm j, the distribution of % is 
independent for different workers i.
Workers produce nothing for one training period. Training is 
firm-specific, so even if a worker has been employed by a previous 
firm he produces nothing in his first period with a new firm. Each firm 
with a trained employee produces p + a units of the good. Firms with 
no employees or an employee in training produce nothing. Firms are 
not allowed to pay a wage less than zero, in other words the only way 
in which they can make workers pay for a job is by tilting the wage 
profile.
There are more workers than firms, so some workers are not 
employed. The first question is whether the unemployed are 
involuntarily unemployed, that is do firms have an incentive to offer 
wages higher than the unemployed workers’ reservation wage?
Assume that in period zero, workers are randomly assigned to 
firms. Firms must decide what wage to pay. Given the assumed 
distribution of q, firms find it optimal to pay a wage equal to 0 in the 
first period and a  thereafter. The cost to the firm of offering a wage 
slightly below a is the chance that a worker quits times the cost of 
training a new worker. It is assumed that the firm will hire the first
/ ( n ) = ( ( l + r )/ ( rP ) ) (n + l + a )  
0
ifi\ >-a




























































































new worker who asks for the job and that, given the wage the firm 
offers, that worker will not reject the job. If there is a chance that 
new hires will quit immediately when they find that the job is not to 
their taste, the costs to the firm will be greater (and somewhat more 
complicated to calculate).
Consider a candidate equilibrium with no quits. There are no 
vacancies in equilibrium and there is a pool of unemployed who take 
any vacant job created by a quit terminating the vacancy chain 
created by deviations from the no quit equilibrium. Hence any workers 
who quit have zero chance of re-employment, and so the value of 
unemployment is 0. This means that workers who know q will quit if 
and only if w + q is negative. Given the strategy of firms, workers 
will gladly accept a period without pay in order to leant q.
Given the assumption about the distribution of q, the firm is 
indifferent between offering a and a slightly lower wage. For w < a, 
the derivative of the expected discounted value of profits with respect 
to the wage is positive. It would be zero if the finn could be certain 
that a replacement worker would accept w. The assumed distribution 
of q was chosen so that the risk of a quit is proportional to the profit at 
the current wage. Thus the ratio of profits lost per period of zero 
output to the risk of a quit is constant. If the firm were sure that a quit 
would imply only one period of lost output, the derivative of profits with 
respect to the wage would be zero. Since this is not certain, the cost 
of a quit is greater than the benefit of reducing wages below a. If a 
firm paying a wage less than a  cuts it further and its employee quits, 
the firm must offer new hires a  or face the risk that they quit as well. 
It is this additional cost which implies that firms paying less than a  will 
definitely not cut their wages further, and that paying wage a gives the 
global maximum of profits.
As noted above, workers are glad of a chance to try a job. In 
other words, the unemployed are involuntarily unemployed. This 
follows from asymmetric information about q, turnover costs and the 
restriction that w must be positive each period. Tilting the wage profile 
is only feasible for the first period of employment before the worker 
learns q. After the worker learns q, workers with q close to -a will 
quit if the wage is cut. Before workers leam q they will accept lower 
wages (for one period) for two reasons - the expected value of q is 
greater than -a and the option to quit after learning q (which is not 
exercised in this equilibrium) has a non-negative value.
For some values of a and p , quits increase the sum of profits 




























































































worker with r| = -a is equal to the product of an experienced worker 
for the single training period, which is a + p . The expected social 
benefit is equal to the expected value of a job at wage a to an 
unemployed worker
3) £(V) = (1 + 1 / r)E( q + a
(a •M1)((H-r)/trg))
(1 + r) + a ),« " " ‘1>'<,is» dr]
Integrating by parts gives
4) " • " • " i . , , ! ......- dt] =
PU + r) 
l-r(P  -1)
this means that the total social benefit signs as the value given by the 
following equation
s.a.
5) benefit —>l+r - (1 + a/P)(l - r(P-l))= rfl -  a/{3 + r((P-l)a/(3)
which is positive so long as P is greater than one and greater than or 
equal to the square root of a/r, e.g if a  = P = 1/r. This in turn implies 
that it is possible for quits of the least satisfied workers to be socially 
useful. This means that there is an equilibrium to the model in which 
the quit rate is lower than socially optimal. A formal model of turnover 
efficiency wages need not imply costs of quits which outweigh the 
benefits of improved matches.
If each firm has a risk neutral proprietor whose welfare is equal 
to profits, this means that quits increase average utility. The firm is 
indifferent between paying a and paying a little less and accepting 
some quits. This means that a small subsidy to quits will not simply 
cause an increase in wages. Such a policy would require a transfer 
from someone to those who quit. These are the agents with the lowest 
level of utility in the equilibrium of this model, so this transfer would 
presumably be desirable in a model with risk aversion. It would also 
increase average utility even in our model without risk aversion.
The subsidy to quits can be considered a short term 
unemployment insurance programme paying some very small amount 
p to the unemployed for at most one period. Unemployment insurance 
paying rp per period available indefinitely would have the same effect 
on quits, given the negligible chance of re-employment. It would also 
imply a transfer from the tax-payers to those already unemployed, 
which does not affect average utility in our model, and is actually 




























































































The assumed distribution of n was chosen in order to give a fat 
upper tail consistent with firms finding it rational to offer a wage which 
allowed no quits. As such it was chosen in order to make the benefits 
from turnover as high as possible but still consistent with an equilibrium 
with zero turnover. The conclusions do not necessarily hold for 
otherwise identical models with different assumptions about the 
distribution of q (e.g. models in which n takes one of two values). It is 
possible that in every Nash equilibrium, many workers quit. It may be 
the case that the profit-maximising wage is less than workers' 
reservation wage so that the labour market clears and there are no 
social benefits of quits. Finally it is possible that there is involuntary 
unemployment, but the social costs of quits outweigh the benefits.
Ill Additional Equilibria of the Model
We have discussed only one possible equilibrium which is 
sustained by the trivial circular argument. There are no quits so there 
are no vacancies so there are no quits. There may, however, be other 
equilibria of the same model in which there are quits. Hence there are 
vacancies so those who quit can find and try new jobs and so there 
are quits. In particular for the model developed above, there is an 
unemployment rate Umax such that if the unemployment rate is below 
Umax, there are equilibria in which workers who prefer their job very 
slightly to unemployment quit.
To describe these equilibria, we assume that workers who 
prefer their current job to indefinite unemployment by e per period quit. 
For expository convenience, we will assume that firms ignore this 
when they choose wages and pay a each period, then demonstrate 
that the effect of such quits on wages strengthens the conclusion that 
there is a Nash equilibrium in which they occur. In the second period 
(the first period after workers learn q) this opens up a number of 
vacancies of order e. In the third period, due to the improved matches, 
the number of workers who prefer their job to unemployment by e or 
less is of order e2. If e is small this means that even if they quit they 
would not create enough vacancies to rationalise quitting. We assume 
that e is small, so there is at most one wave of quits. This means that 
quitters have only one chance to get a new job and if they are not 
hired in the second period are never hired.
For it to be rational to quit if the wage is a and if and only if




























































































it is necessary for the value of unemployment and job search in the 
second period to be equal to e(l+r)/r, the value of the foregone job. 
The value of unemployment in the second period is the probability of 
finding a job times the value of a new job. Recall the value of finding a 
new job as described in equation 4.
6) £(V )-
P( l +r )
l - r ( p - l )
The probability of finding a new job is equal to the number of 
vacancies F(-ot+e)n, where n is the number of jobs, divided by the 
number of unemployed F(-a+e)n + u, where u is the number of 
unemployed in the absence of quits. This means that (for wage = a 
each period) quitting if q £ -a + e is rational if the following inequality 
holds
7) P(l+/-)F(-a + e)fl £(!+/•) " Q 
[ l-r (P  -  !)](«+ F(-a  + £)) r
for small e, F(-a+e) is approximately equal to e(1 +r) l(rfi) and is much 
smaller than u so inequality 7 is approximately equivalent to inequality 
8) .
8)
[ l - r ( P  -  Dll#
- 1>0
If, as in the example discussed above, (3 is equal to 1/r, equation 
8 holds so long as the unemployment rate is less than (l+r)/(l+2r), a 
rate which, despite considerable efforts in certain countries, has not yet 
been achieved in practice. If inequality 8 holds, then there is an e so 
low that if the wage equals a each period, it is rational to quit if one 
prefers one's job to unemployment by e each period. Clearly if one 
prefers one's job to the average job, it is not rational to quit for a 
chance of obtaining a different job. The left side of inequality 7 is 
continuous in e, so there is an e such that it is rational to quit if and only 
if q < - a  + e. In fact the left side is concave in e so this value of e is 
unique.
So far we have assumed that firms ignore the fact that workers 
quit in this equilibrium and pay wages equal to a  as in the no-quit 
equilibrium. If firms raise wages when workers are selective, then 
they may eliminate the quitting equilibrium. In our model, firms 
actually cut wages if workers are selective about jobs, and this makes 




























































































This is a consequence of the form assumed for f(r|) but the opposite 
may hold for other distributions. The reason that quitting reduces 
wages is that the reverse hazard is declining in q, that is the likelihood 
that a worker likes his job q. divided by the probability that he likes it 
more than q, decreases in q. This means that if workers quit when 
w+q is less than e, this reduces the expected costs of decreasing the 
wage proportionally more than it reduces the expected benefits. So if 
workers are more selective, firms will offer wages below a, thus 
encouraging quits still more. For any positive wage, there are some 
workers who like their job so much that it is irrational for them to quit 
no matter how many vacant jobs there are. This means that the 
continuity argument used above demonstrates an equilibrium in which 
workers who prefer their job to indefinite unemployment by a very 
small amount quit.
Another effect which supports quitting equilibria is the following: 
if some workers quit, those who keep their jobs reveal that they like 
them. Their employer might exploit this knowledge by reducing their 
wage. In contrast if a worker quits and finds a new job, the employer 
does not know how much he likes it and cannot do this. Such 
behaviour by firms may be ruled out by contracts which are mutually 
beneficial to firms and workers in our model, but in any case if it 
occurs it encourages quits. In short, our assumption that wages equal 
a works against our conclusion that there is an additional equilibrium in 
which quits occur.
IV The importance of restrictions on allowed contracts and 
the surprising sign of the effects of such restrictions
In the preceding discussion we casually assumed that wage 
payments must be non-negative. This assumption rules out contracts 
which increase profits and are acceptable to unemployed job 
applicants. As is well known, turnover costs do not imply involuntary 
unemployment if firms can demand bonds, that is, insist that workers 
pay for their jobs. With our assumption about workers' preferences, 
bonding implies no efficiency costs, since workers are indifferent about 
when they consume. If firms charge workers the expected present 
value of a job, the labour market clears. This means that a quit 




























































































optimal quit probability is at least as high as the consumer surplus 
maximising quit probability or, with risk neutrality, the utilitarian 
optimum (from now on called the efficient quit probability).
If firms can charge bonds, they capture all of the gains from 
trade. Firms can determine the quit rate via their control over wages. 
If they can demand bonds which are forfeited if workers quit, they can 
choose the probability of quitting without transfers with positive 
expected value to workers. This means that if firms cooperate, they 
will choose the wage that causes an efficient quit probability. In our 
model, firms can affect other firms only by offering contracts which are 
more or less attractive to workers. If firms charge workers the 
expected present value of jobs, all contracts are equally attractive to 
workers (e.g. not very, but enough). This means that the privately 
optimal contract is the same as that which firms would choose if they 
cooperated. This means that the quit probability is efficient if firms 
choose privately optimal wages and bonds.
The result described above may be counter-intuitive. It has 
been demonstrated (in section II) that if charging bonds is not allowed, 
the quit probability is zero. It has also been demonstrated that the 
efficient quit probability is positive. This means that the quit rate is 
higher if bonds are allowed than if they are banned. This may seem a 
bit odd, since bonds are often considered a costless alternative to 
efficiency wages. In the context of a specific capital/tumover model, 
bonds are a way in which firms can prevent quits without cost to 
themselves. It might seem odd that firms which can prevent quits 
without cost do not do so. It might seem odder still that firms which 
must sacrifice a positive share of the gains from trade to workers in 
order to prevent quits entirely. The reason for this apparent paradox is 
that bonds don't just penalise workers who quit. They also reward 
firms whose workers quit. If firms can charge workers for jobs, they 
don't mind so much if their trained worker quits. They must train a 
new worker, but they can collect a new bond.
While bonding is the standard alternative to non-market clearing 
wages in the efficiency wages literature, the bilateral matching 
literature (Mortensen [1978], Diamond and Maskin [1979]) considers 
another form of possible payments from workers to firms - 
compensatory damages. If there is a risk that workers quit, the 
efficient contract requires them to pay firms enough to compensate for 
the cost to the firm of the quit. This means that workers only quit if it 
increases the sum of their utility and the firm's present value of profits. 
This guarantees bilaterally optimal quit rates, and with an appropriate 
adjustment of the wage this is a bilateral Pareto improvement over 




























































































out by our assumption that payments from firms to workers must be 
non-negative.
In our model, workers and firms are risk neutral. This means 
that bonds and damages paid for quitting are exactly equivalent. 
Suppose the worker receives w if he doesn't quit and pays D if he 
does. An identical distribution of profits and utility of the worker arises 
if the worker posts a bond of D and is paid w + rD when employed and 
is free to quit and receive 0. If the worker quits, he transfers the 
present value of rD to the firm, which is still D. If the worker doesn't 
quit, he gets rD each period in exchange for giving D to the firm when 
taking the job. Workers with discount rate r are indifferent between 
the contract with a bond and the contract with damages. Firms which 
maximise the expected present value of profits are also indifferent. 
This means that the market outcome with damages is identical to the 
market outcome with bonds, which in turn means that privately optimal 
contracts cause the efficient quit probability.
Again, this result is counterintuitive. If contracts which require 
workers to pay fines when they quit are allowed, workers quit. If such 
contracts are illegal, workers do not quit. The reason for this 
apparently puzzling result also explains that the quit probability is 
increased if firms are allowed to charge bonds.
The arguments above are perhaps too brief to be clear. In the 
remainder of section IV we will calculate the efficient quit probability 
for the model of section II. We will derive the contract with damages 
which maximises firms' expected profits, subject to the labour supply 
constraint. We will demonstrate that this constraint binds in 
equilibrium, that is that the labour market clears and that there is no 
involuntary unemployment. Finally we will demonstrate that, if firms 
with vacant jobs offer unemployed workers the expected profit 
maximising contracts, workers will quit if and only if it is efficient for 
them to do so.
Before doing any formal analysis it is important to note that our 
assumption of risk neutrality is rather implausible but is essential for 
this conclusion. If bonds or damages are allowed, workers have zero 
expected utility and all benefits from the existence of firms go to their 
owners. If the world were as described by our model, a utilitarian 
would not care about the distribution of income. A concern for 
equality could eliminate any relevance of our arguments in favour of 
bonds or damages for quits. This is in sharp contrast to the arguments 





























































































Proceeding somewhat more formally, first we calculate the 
allocatively efficient quit rule. That is, we find n' such that average 
happiness is maximised if worker i quits if she finds herself working in 
job j with fly less than r|* The contribution to total utility of a quit is 
clearly decreasing in r ,̂ so the effect on total utility of a quit by a 
worker for whom = n* is zero. This effect is the value of a vacant 
job to the firm, plus the value to the unemployed workers, minus the 
value of the filled job with = n‘, and is described by equation 9 
where VV is the social value of a vacant job.
9) 0 = VV(r|*) - (a+0+rf)(l+r)/r
The value of a vacant job is equal to E(n), the expected training cost, 
plus the expected value of a filled job, times the probability that the 
new worker decides to keep it, plus the value of a vacant job, times 
the probability that the new worker quits. This is expressed by 
equation 10:
10) W (jj) = E(q) + E ( a + 0 +p I n>flXTF(ii))/r + VV(nXF(a))/1 +r
which describes the contribution of a vacant job to total welfare, 
assuming workers quit if is less than a, which may or may not be 
equal to the utilitarian optimal q‘, or in other "words" equation 11 
describes the social value of a vacant job:
11) VV(n) = E(t)) + E(ct + 0 + T)lT)>a)(l-F(Ti))/r
1 - (F(jj))/l+r
Combining equations 9 and 11 gives the following expression for n*:
12)
E(r|) + E(a + 0 + q I n>n')(l-F(ti‘))/r 
_______________________________  = (a+0+q‘)(l+r)/r
1 - (F(n*))/l+r
Note that we have made no assumptions in this section about 
the shape of f or F, and so this formula is as general as it is empty of 
content. Our substantive claim is that if firms are allowed to charge 
bonds, they will do so and pay wages that cause workers to quit if n,j < 
H*. that is if and only if it increases average utility for that worker to 




























































































Assume now that workers quit if it is privately optimal to do so 
and that firms choose wage w and sell the job for bond B. First it 
should be clear that at any wage w, firms will sell the job for the 
largest bond that unemployed workers are willing to pay. The bond is 
a simple transfer from newly hired workers to firms and has no effect 
on workers' subsequent actions. Furthermore, all unemployed are 
identical, so there is no possible selection effect of a large bond. A 
firm with a vacancy chooses B and w to maximise its expected 
discounted profits, that is the value of a vacant job to the firm VF (not 
to be confused with VV, the social value of a vacant job). VF is 
described by equation 13, the asset value equation
13) VF(w,B) = B + (a + P - w)(l-F(w))/r + F(w)VF/(l+r)
and the firm will charge B, equal to the value of trying out a job to the 
unemployed. This means that the value of unemployment is zero. 
Even though they are job openings, they have a price equal to their 
value. This means that the value of trying out a job to a worker VW is 
given by
14) B = VW(w) = E(n) + E(w+n I >l>wXl-F(w))/r
which asserts that the bond is equal to the value of trying out a job, 
which is equal to the expected (dis)utility of unpaid training, plus the 
expected value of a job the worker keeps, times the probability it is 
kept. Combining equations 13 and 14 gives an equation for the 
expected value of the firms' profits as a function of the wage alone, 
assuming that the optimal bond is charged
15) VF(w) = E(n) + E(a + P + q I q>w)(l-F(w)) + F(w)VF/(l+r)
Equation 15, which describes the value of the firm as a function 
of w, is identical to equation 10, which describes total utility as a 
function of therefore the firm will choose w = q’, which implies that 
workers will quit if and only if ntj is less than q', or in other words if and 
only if it increases total utility. We have shown that the privately 
optimal bond and wage chosen by firms cause a utilitarian optimal 
outcome and in particular an optimum in which firms capture all of the 
gains from trade. We emphasise that this result does not depend on 
any assumptions about the distribution of q. It does however depend 
on the assumption of risk neutrality, that is, that a utilitarian should not 
care about the distribution of income. This means that it has no 
relevance to deciding if firms should be allowed to sell jobs. 
Nonetheless it is striking that if f(q) is as assumed in section II, 




























































































thought that bonds were a way of preventing quits which is costless to 
firms and which would cause a lower quit rate.
The analysis of contracts with compensatory damages is 
identical to the analysis of contracts with bonds. For any wage-bond 
contract there is an identical wage-damages (fine for quitting) contract 
and vice versa. Given risk neutrality and perfect capital markets, a 
contract in which a worker pays B when hired and is paid wage w is 
identical from the point of view of the worker and the firm to a 
contract in which the worker need post no bond, is paid w - rB and 
must pay B in damages when he quits. Therefore the profit 
maximising wage-damages contract will imply efficient quit rates. As 
noted by Mortensen [1978], bilaterally efficient wage-damages 
contracts involve compensatory damages which must therefore imply 
efficient quit rates.
This result follows trivially from the analysis of wage-bond 
contracts but is perhaps even more striking. We have given an 
example in vvhich the quit rate is zero if workers are not allowed to 
pay fines if they quit, and in which the quit rate is positive if workers 
can and do agree to pay such fines.
V Stigma Caused by Quitting
A key simplifying assumption of the model described in sections 
II and 111 is that workers are identical except for their taste for specific 
jobs. Since it is assumed thatrj^is match-specific, each worker is 
equally attractive to each firm, and in particular quitting is not 
stigmatised. In reality workers who quit may give the impression that 
they are lazy or difficult to please, and may have more difficulty finding 
new jobs than new entrants have. This is an additional cost of quitting 
and is particularly interesting to us because it is a private rather than a 
social cost. This stigma does not change the conditions for a no quit 
equilibrium in the model described in section II. In this equilibrium, 
workers quit only if they are indifferent between their current job and 
permanent unemployment. Stigma is not a factor since the assumption 
of excess supply of labour and the Nash conjecture of zero quits 
together imply that chances of re-employment are zero in this 
equilibrium anyway.
Stigma is, however, very important if the labour market is 
assumed to clear. If new entrants are assumed to be able to find jobs, 




























































































If stigma prevents quitters from finding jobs, they may envy the 
employed without being able to bid down wages. Technically, since 
the unemployed are distinguishable from the employed (and not just 
because they have no job), and since the wage offered can be 
conditioned on their status, their unemployment is not involuntary. In 
this section we present a model in which the fear of stigma prevents 
quitting, even though the labour market clears and there is no 
involuntary unemployment in the no quitting Nash equilibrium.
In the model with stigma, there is a constant flow of young 
workers and a balancing rate of death of old workers. In addition, 
some workers become bored or irritable, that is their q drops so they 
find work less pleasant and unemployment relatively more desirable. 
Crucially this change affects their taste for all work equally. This 
means they quit their current job (unless it is very desirable) and are 
likely to quit any new job when they find out what it is like. This 
makes them unattractive to firms. It is also important that the decline 
in their taste for work is not great enough that they would turn down a 
new job if offered. Instead they would take it, just in case it turns out 
to be such a perfect match to their tastes that they would want to keep 
it, in spite of their generally strong distaste for work, which means that 
quitters will be available for work but unemployable.
To be more precise, assume that the number of workers is N. 
Assume that 5 N new workers are bom each period, and that 5 N old 
workers (or unemployed potential workers) die. Assume also that for 
a fraction, <J>, of workers in employment, q falls in their current and any 
future job. In particular, assume that in steady state a fraction y < <t> of 
employed workers quit each period for this reason. Finally assume that 
the decline in q is small enough that they would still like to try new 
jobs out, knowing that they are very likely to quit when they find out 
what the job is like. Clearly a decline in q could be assumed and Y 
calculated for the steady state in which only workers whose inclination 
to work has dropped, quit. This would be messy and not very useful. 
Finally assume that there are 1/(1 +Y ) firms, each of which wants one 
worker. This implies that there are exactly the same number of 
industrious workers as jobs. Needless to say, it would be more 
satisfactory to describe an elastic labour demand curve and find 
whether this is true at the profit maximising wage.
The firms’ choices can be analysed as before with one change. 
Instead of discounting the future by (1/(1 + /•))'"' they discount by




























































































That is, they discount the advantage of reducing the wage by the 
chance that the worker whose wage they have cut will be dead or will 
have quit.
Similarly, the value of a job is the discounted sum of utilities, 
further discounted by the chance that the worker will die or quit. In 
addition, the worker must consider the possibility that he will find work 
less pleasant in the future, but that the job will be a good enough match 
that he will keep it. This reduces the expected value of an unknown 
job. It also affects the relative value of good and bad jobs. In 
particular it reduces the superiority of good jobs over bad ones. A 
worker in a bad job is more likely to exercise the option to quit if his 
desire to work drops.
While workers will consider this, we do not, and simply assume 
that <t> is small enough that this effect is negligible (since y is smaller 
still, the effect of quits on the firm's strategy is negligible as well).
With aii of these assumptions, one possible Nash equilibrium is 
similar to the no quit Nash equilibrium in the model with an excess 
supply of workers (except for the change in the discount rate caused 
by death and quits). Workers accept the first job they are offered and 
never quit unless they become generally lazy. This choice is enforced 
by the fact that any worker who quits is stigmatised and, in this 
equilibrium, is never offered a job again.
Note that if a worker quits because of dissatisfaction with his job 
rather than a general disinclination to work, there will be one more 
vacancy than usual. However, all of the lazy quitters will apply for the 
job not taken by the new entrants. The chance that any one quitter 
will ever get a job is infinitesimal, and in particular the chance that our 
hypothetical industrious quitter will get one is as low as that of his lazy 
but indistinguishable fellow applicants.
Interestingly, the second model has another equilibrium if <t> is 
small enough. Assume in particular that the number of workers who 
have become lazy and quit is much greater than one (as required for 
the argument above) but much smaller than the number of workers 
who do not like their job and would like to try a new one (but not 
enough to choose almost certain permanent unemployment for an 
infinitesimal chance of trying a new job). Since we have assumed risk 
neutrality, a worker would like to try a new job if the expected value of 
a job picked at random is greater than the value of his current job by 
at least a, the cost of one period's wages foregone while in training. 
The options to quit again can only increase the value of trying a new 




























































































If almost all of such workers quit, the number of vacancies will 
be large compared to the number of lazy quitters (which equals the 
number of workers who will not be offered jobs). In other words, each 
job searcher will have a high chance of finding a new job in his first 
period of search (and more chances later if he doesn't succeed the first 
time). Given this, almost all workers who would like to try a new job 
will quit.
This means that for a small enough <{>, the model has two 
equilibria (at least). One in which workers only quit if they find they 
like work so little that they don't mind permanent unemployment, and 
another in which almost all workers who value their job one period's 
wage less than the average job will quit.
This case of multiple equilibria is analogous to the signalling and 
pooling equilibria of signalling models. In our model and in signalling 
models, agents are of different types, know their type and attempt to 
influence the inference of their type by other agents. As in signalling 
models, externalities occur because different actions of one agent 
make it more or less difficult to infer the type of other agents from their 
actions. The low quit equilibrium is a signalling equilibrium in which 
industrious workers signal that they are not lazy by sticking to jobs 
which they do not like. The high quit equilibrium is a pooling 
equilibrium in which lazy and industrious workers do the same thing, so 
firms cannot learn their type from their actions.
VI Delays in Matching: a third model
In the models described above, it was assumed that vacant jobs 
are filled instantly. The only reason for firms to fear quits is the cost of 
training new workers. A delay during which the job is empty 
imposes an additional cost on the firm. In contrast, a delay in finding 
job openings obviously does not impose any cost on quitters in the no 
quit Nash equilibrium, since they have a zero chance of re-employment 
in this particular equilibrium of the previous model.
In particular, if a job remains vacant for one period and there is 
no need for training, then the firm's problem remains the same. To 
maintain comparability we assume that in each period one worker can 
apply for the job and find out if he likes it with cost. If the worker 
chooses not to take the job, the firm must wait until the next period to 
offer it to another worker. The model is equivalent to that given above 
from the firm’s point of view. A vacant job is equivalent to a job filled 




























































































In contrast, this change makes a job opening more valuable to 
the unemployed. They do not need to sacrifice one period of leisure 
for one period of unpaid training. This means that the vacancy value of 
a job to workers is increased by n and is non-negative no matter how 
low the wage. In particular, this implies that the result described 
above remains true. A quit subsidy can increase average utility even 
though it reduces measured output.
More interestingly, this implies that such a result holds for more 
plausible distributions of q. For any distribution of q, the unemployed 
will benefit from a quit. Since they can try jobs without cost, the 
benefit must be non-negative. It is zero only if the firm offers a wage 
so low that no applicant takes the job when he finds what it is like. 
This would imply zero profits, so no firm would do this. Therefore the 
unemployed benefit when a worker quits.
The conditions for the benefit to the unemployed to exceed the 
cost to the firm are much less stringent than in the firm-specific 
training model (model one). In particular it is possible to describe 
examples of economies in which the privately optimal quit rate is lower 
than the socially optimal quit rate, even if q only takes negative values, 
that is, even if no worker actually enjoys his work.
Consider the following model. Assume that workers can learn 
immediately, at no cost to themselves, how much a job pleases them. 
Assume further that no firm-specific or general training is required for 
them to do the work. Assume, however, that it takes one period for a 
worker and a job to be matched. In other words, assume that one 
period is used up for each worker who looks at the job (without 
expending effort or producing output) and decide if he likes it. This 
means that firms bear all of the turnover costs and that turnover costs 
are lower by q, the effort required for training in model one. Given 
these assumptions, it is relatively easy to find an example in which 
quits are socially desirable.
In particular assume, as in the first model, that there are many 
firms, each of which hires up to one worker who produces l+(3. 
Assume the same risk neutral utility function as in model one, but now 
assume that q is distributed as follows
q = -1 with probability p,




























































































n = 0 with probability 1 -p, - p 7
This is clearly one of the simplest possible distributions for r)
Depending on p, Pi and p2, firms will pay wage w equal to 1, 
1/2 or 0. We consider the case in which firms choose to pay a wage 
equal to one. The potential benefit of offering a wage of zero is that, 
with probability 1 ~Pt ~p7> the firm saves 1 per period. The cost is that, 
with probability Pt*P2 , the firm's employee quits. If so, given our 
assumptions, it is optimal for the firm to offer replacement workers a 
wage of 1. This means that the only effect is that the firm loses one 
period’s profits, p. The firm will not choose to cut the wage to zero if 
the following inequality holds
16)
r(Pi* P2)
We will assume for convenience that inequality 16 holds with 
equality, so the firm is indifferent between paying 1 and paying 0. It 
will be clear below that small violations of this assumption do not affect 
our conclusions.
Similarly the firm will not pay wages equal to 1/2 if inequality 17
holds.
17) ></>,)
Again, for convenience, we assume that this condition holds 
with equality, yielding the following equation, which is simply a 
restatement of this assumption.
18) Pl = Pl (1 -Pi)(1 + Pl)
Our assumptions allow us to calculate P and as functions of Pi
and r.
It is easy to characterise the values of Pi and r, which imply 
that the externalities caused by a quit are, on balance, positive - that 
the benefit to some unemployed worker who gets a chance to take a
1 We considered a distribution in which q takes only two values and 




























































































job is greater than the cost to the firm. In the following paragraph we 
discuss the effect on the sum of all agents' utilities if one worker who 
has n = -1 and does not care whether he keeps his job or is 
unemployed chooses to take that second option by quitting.
The cost to the firm is simply one period's lost profits p. The 
benefit to the worker who takes his place is given by
19) benefit = (1-2p j  (1+ />,))//• + />,(!- pt)l(2r(l + />,))
multiplying the net social benefit of a quit by r /(I -p,) gives equation 20 
where s.a. means signs as
20) net benefit - 1 / 2 - \ l l
1 + /’, 2
As long as r is less than 1/2, there is a p, less than one for which 
the net social benefit is positive. In particular, for r equal to zero the 
net social benefit is positive as long as p, is greater than (/5-l)/2, the 
golden section. In that case, the benefit of a quit to the unemployed is 
greater than the cost to the employer.
While the example described above is certainly particular, it 
demonstrates that rather ordinary assumptions about tastes for 
different jobs are consistent with a socially sub-optimal quit rate. 
Various simplifying assumptions were made to ease the analysis of an 
already very simple model. The final result leaves room for flexibility 
in these assumptions. The conclusion does not rely, for example, on 
the assumption that employers are just indifferent between the benefits 
and costs of cutting the wage they offer.
VII Generalisations
The models considered above are stylised even by the standards 
of economic theory. In this section we attempt to discuss the 
robustness of our results to generalisations of our assumptions.
First it should be clear that the results (those reported in 
sections II, III and V in particular) depend on the assumptions about 
the distribution of n, the non-pecuniary utility of jobs. The distribution 
considered is unusual and our choice of it was not innocent. While the 




























































































they too are certainly sensitive to assumptions about the distribution of 
q. Thus our results should be interpreted as examples, and in 
particular as counter-examples, disproving the claim that quits always 
impose negative net externalities.
We have assumed risk neutrality, and therefore have nothing to 
say about the costs or benefits of redistribution of income. This 
assumption is clearly too strong. Relaxing it would strengthen our 
conclusion that unemployment insurance can increase average utility. 
Normally it is argued that unemployment insurance is good, firstly 
because it is insurance and secondly because it redistributes income 
from the rich to the poor. We assume that workers face no risks and 
are not risk averse. We assume that there is no utilitarian rationale for 
redistribution. The fact that we can still rationalise unemployment 
insurance is striking, much more so than if we had assumed risk and 
risk aversion.
Oddly, for an article concerned with quits and quit rates, we 
present models in which the quit rate is zero or very low in equilibrium. 
We could, without difficulty, have added a lower tail to the distribution 
of q, consisting of matches so bad that firms would not find it profitable 
to pay wages high enough to keep workers who disliked the work they 
were offered so much. Such a modification would have added to the 
realism of our models. It would also have strengthened our 
conclusions. If there are such matches, one quit would lead to a string 
of quits. Each would provide the same benefits to the unemployed and 
impose the same costs on the firm. The magnitude of the social costs 
or benefits of a quit would be increased, but its sign would remain the 
same. In contrast, the existence of workers who dislike the job they 
are offered would inhibit the firms’ willingness to cut wages and risk a 
quit by a marginally satisfied worker. The benefit of cutting the wage 
would not be affected, but the cost would be increased. The firm 
would face more than the loss of one period’s profits, since it would 
fear having to offer the job to many workers before finding one who 
would accept it at the original wage. This means that considering 
extremely bad matches (extremely low ps) and quits in all equilibria 
would make it easier to construct examples in which the cost of a quit 
is great enough to keep firms from cutting wages, but smaller than the 
benefit of the quit to the unemployed or to dissatisfied workers.
We have considered only two variants of the turnover efficiency 
wage model. There are many other models of involuntary 
unemployment, and it is worthwhile considering whether similar results 
could be obtained for economies described by these models. We chose 




























































































lead to inefficiently low turnover. It should be easier to construct 
examples of this for other models.
In particular, consider the principal/agent or work/shirk model. 
If firms do not cut wages because they fear that workers will then only 
pretend to work, our conclusions may be strengthened. In the principal 
agent model, shirking is assumed to be more costly to the firm than 
quitting, as implied by the assumption that firing shirkers is not 
dynamically inconsistent. In fact it is typically assumed that quits 
impose no costs directly, since firm-specific training is not generally 
considered. This means that a subsidy available to quitters but not to 
workers fired for cause is less costly in the principal agent model than 
in our models. Of course it is difficult to implement such schemes in 
practice.
For a morale model, there is no particular reason to assume that 
a subsidy to quits or an exogenous increase in the quit rate imposes 
any costs on firms. We suspect that ARY are implicitly considering 
such a model, and that this is the reason they are unconcerned about 
the questions we have discussed at length.
VIII Conclusions
The purpose of this paper is to extend and provide firmer 
microeconomic foundations for the ideas and results presented in 
Akerloff, Rose and Yellen [1988]. It attempts to answer the 
economists' question "I know it works in practice but does it work in 
theory?". In particular, it includes an explanation of the non-market 
clearing (or potential non-market clearing) required for ARY's 
argument. It attempts to respond to the concern that ARY find positive 
externalities due to quits, but only by assuming that involuntary 
unemployment already exists. Since many models of involuntary 
unemployment suggest that anything which makes quitting (or being 
fired) more desirable will increase unemployment, it is possible that a 
model with involuntary unemployment will imply additional costs of 
quits. It is at least conceivable that these costs must outweigh the 
benefits of improved matches and increased job satisfaction.
We assume that firms are willing to pay higher than market 
clearing wages to reduce turnover costs incurred when workers quit. 
This would appear to be the model of involuntary unemployment least 
favourable to ARY's arguments. We find that it is possible for the 
privately optimal quit rate to be too low. In our models it is possible 




























































































insurance increases money metric utility, which implies that it 
increases average utility, since we assume risk neutrality.
This result is interesting, since it is generally assumed that 
unemployment insurance reduces money metric utility and is justified 
only because agents are risk averse.
We also find inefficiently low quits rates without involuntary 
unemployment in one equilibrium of a model of heterogeneous 
workers. This model has multiple equilibria which are in effect 
screening and pooling equilibria. Such multiplicities have been noted 
in the economics of information literature. The example we present 
has clear macroeconomic implications.
Most strikingly, our conclusion that inefficiently low quit rates 
are possible depends on restrictions imposed on those contracts which 
are allowed and, in particular, on the fact that we do not allow workers 
to agree to pay fines if they quit. In our model, workers do not quit if 
they cannot agree to pay such fines, and do quit and pay fines if they 
can.
References
Akerloff G., Rose A. and J. Yellen (1988), "Job switching and job 
satisfaction in the U.S. labor market," Brookings Papers on 
Economic Activity , 2, pp 495-582.
Diamond P. (1981), "Mobility costs, frictional unemployment and 
efficiency," Journal of Political Economy, vol 89, pp 798-812.
Diamond P. and E. Maskin (1979), "An equilibrium analysis of search 
and breach of contract; 1: steady states". Bell Journal of 
Economics, vol. 10, 1, pp. 282-316.
Hashimoto M. (1981), "Firm-specific human capital as a joint 
investment," American Economic Review, vol 71, pp 475-81.
Jovanovic B. (1979), "Job matching and the theory of turnover," 
Journal of Political Economy, vol 87, pp 972-990.
Marnie S. (1992), "The Soviet Labour Market in Transition", PhD 




























































































Mortensen D. (1978), "Specific capital and labor turnover," Bell 
Journal of Economics, vol 9, pp 572-586.
Mortensen D. (1986), "Job search and labor market analysis", in 
Handbook of Labor Economics. Ashenfelter O. and Layard R., 
eds, (Elsevier Science Publishers Press) pp 849-919.
Salop S. (1979) "A model of the natural rate of unemployment," 
American Economic Review, vol 69, pp 117-25.
Schlicht E. (1978) Labour turnover, wage structure and natural 
unemployment," Zeitschrift fur die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft. 
vol 134, pp 337-46.
Stiglitz J. (1974), "Wage determination and unemployment in 































































































EUI Working Papers are published and distributed by the 
European University Institute, Florence
Copies can be obtained free of charge -  depending on the availability of
stocks -  from:
The Publications Officer 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana
1-50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) 
Italy



























































































Publications of the European University Institute
Economics Department Working Paper Series
To Economics Department WP
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana





□  Please enter/confirm my name on EUI Economics Dept. Mailing List
□  Please send me a complete list of EUI Working Papers
□ Please send me a complete list of EUI book publications
□  Please send me the EUI brochure Academic Year 1992/93




































































































Working Papers of the Department of Economics 
Published since 1990
ECO No. 90/1
Tamer BASAR and Mark SALMON 
Credibility and the Value of Information 




The EMS -  The First Ten Years
Policies -  Developments -  Evolution
ECO No. 90/3
Peter J. HAMMOND 
Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility: 
Why and how they are and should be 
made
ECO No. 90/4
Peter J. HAMMOND 




Independence of Irrelevant Interpersonal
Comparisons
ECO No. 90/6 
Hal R. VARIAN 
A Solution to the Problem of 
Externalities and Public Goods when 
Agents are Well-Informed
ECO No. 90/7 
Hal R. VARIAN
Sequential Provision of Public Goods 
ECO No. 90/8
T. BRIANZA, L. PHLIPS and J.F. 
RICHARD
Futures Markets, Speculation and 
Monopoly Pricing
ECO No. 90/9
Anthony B. ATKINSON/ John 
MICKLEWRIGHT 
Unemployment Compensation and 




The Role of Information in Economics
ECO No. 90/11
Nicos M. CHRISTODOULAKIS 




On the Economic Rationale for
Codeterminadon Law
ECO No. 90/13 
Elettra AGLLARDI
Learning by Doing and Market Structures
ECO No. 90/14
Peter J. HAMMOND 
Intertemporal Objectives
ECO No. 90/15
Andrew EVANS/Stephen MARTIN 
Socially Acceptable Distortion of 
Competition: EC Policy on State Aid
ECO No. 90/16 
Stephen MARTIN 
Fringe Size and Cartel Stability
ECO No. 90/17 
John MICKLEWRIGHT 
Why Do Less Than a Quarter of the 
Unemployed in Britain Receive 
Unemployment Insurance?
ECO No. 90/18
Mrudula A  PATEL 
Optimal Life Cycle Saving With 
Borrowing Constraints:
A Graphical Solution
ECO No. 90/19 
Peter J. HAMMOND 
Money Metric Measures of Individual 
and Social Welfare Allowing for 
Environmental Externalities
ECO No. 90/20 
Louis PHLIPS/
Ronald M. HARSTAD 
Oligopolistic Manipulation of Spot 
Markets and the Timing of Futures 
Market Speculation





























































































Earnings Adjustment of Temporary
Migrants
ECO No. 90/22 
John MICKLEWRIGHT 
The Reform of Unemployment 
Compensation:
Choices for East and West
ECO No. 90/23 
Joerg MAYER









Temporary Layoffs and the Duration of 
Unemployment: An Empirical Analysis
ECO No. 90/26 
Stephan L. KALB
Market-Led Approaches to European 
Monetary Union in the Light of a Legal 
Restrictions Theory of Money
ECO No. 90/27 
Robert J. WALDMANN 
Implausible Results or Implausible Data? 
Anomalies in the Construction of Value 
Added Data and Implications for Esti­
mates of Price-Cost Markups
ECO No. 90/28 
Stephen MARTIN




Imperfect Competition in an Open 
Economy
if- if  if  
ECO No. 91/30
Steve ALPERN/Dennis J. SNOWER 
Unemployment Through ‘Learning From 
Experience’
ECO No. 91/31
David M. PRESCOTT/Thanasis 
STENGOS
Testing for Forecastible Nonlinear 
Dependence in Weekly Gold Rates of 
Return
ECO No. 91/32
Peter J. HAMMOND 
Harsanyi’s Utilitarian Theorem:





Economic Transformation in Eastern 
Europe and the Distribution of Income
ECO No. 91/34 
Svend ALBAEK
On Nash and Stackelberg Equilibria 
when Costs are Private Information
ECO No. 91/35
Stephen MARTIN 
Private and Social Incentives 
to Form R & D Joint Ventures
ECO No. 91/36 
Louis PHLIPS
Manipulation of Crude Oil Futures 
ECO No. 91/37
Xavier CALSAMIGLIA/Alan KIR MAN 
A Unique Informationally Efficient and 









The Moral Status of Profits and Other
Rewards:
A Perspective From Modem Welfare 
Economics




























































































Vincent BROUSSEAU/Alan KIRMAN 
The Dynamics of Learning in Mis- 
Specified Models
ECO No. 91/41
Robert James WALDMANN 
Assessing the Relative Sizes of Industry- 
and Nation Specific Shocks to Output
ECO No. 91/42
Thorsten HENS/Alan KIRMAN/Louis 
PHLIPS
Exchange Rates and Oligopoly
ECO No. 91/43
Peter J. HAMMOND 




Endogenous Firm Efficiency in a Cournot 
Principal-Agent Model
ECO No. 91/45 
Svend ALBAEK





A Comparison of Risk-Premium 
Forecasts Implied by Parametric Versus 








Should Bankruptcy Proceedings be 




Market-Making and Decentralized Trade 
ECO No. 91/50
Jeffrey L. COLES/Peter J. HAMMOND 
Walrasian Equilibrium without Survival: 
Existence, Efficiency, and Remedial 
Policy
ECO No. 91/51
Frank CRITCHLEY/Paul MARRIOTT/ 
Mark SALMON




The Influence of Futures on Spot Price
Volatility in a Model for a Storable
Commodity
ECO No. 91/53
Frank CRITCHLEY/Paul MARRIOTT/ 
Mark SALMON
Preferred Point Geometry and the Local 














Why do Women Married to Unemployed
Men have Low Participation Rates?
ECO No. 91/57
John MICKLEWRIGHT








Reconciling the Term Structure of 




Inventory Holdings by a Monopolist
Middleman






























































































The Occupational Success of Young Men 
Who Left School at Sixteen
ECO No. 92/62
Pier Luigi SACCO
Noise Traders Permanence in Stock
Markets: A Tâtonnement Approach.
I: Informational Dynamics for the Two- 
Dimensional Case
ECO No. 92/63 
Robert J. WALDMANN 
Asymmetric Oligopolies
ECO No. 92/64
Robert J. WALDMANN /Stephen 
C. SMITH
A Partial Solution to the Financial Risk 
and Perverse Response Problems of 
Labour-Managed Firms: Industry- 
Average Performance Bonds
ECO No. 92/65
Agustrn MARA V ALL/V ictor GÔMEZ 
Signal Extraction in ARIMA Time Series 
Program SEATS
ECO No. 92/66 
Luigi BRIGHI
A Note on the Demand Theory of the 
Weak Axioms
ECO No. 92/67 
Nikolaos GEORGANTZIS 
The Effect of Mergers on Potential 
Competition under Economies or 
Diseconomies of Joint Production
ECO No. 92/68 
Robert J. WALDMANN/
J. Bradford DE LONG 
Interpreting Procyclical Productivity: 






and Family Labour Supply: A Dynamic
Analysis
ECO No. 92/70
Fabio CANOVA/Bruce E. HANSEN 
Are Seasonal Patterns Constant Over 
Time? A Test for Seasonal Stability
ECO No. 92/71
Alessandra PELLONI 
Long-Run Consequences of Finite 
Exchange Rate Bubbles
ECO No. 92/72 
Jane MARRINAN
The Effects of Government Spending on 
Saving and Investment in an Open 
Economy
ECO No. 92/73
Fabio CANOVA and Jane MARRINAN 
Profits, Risk and Uncertainty in Foreign 
Exchange Markets
ECO No. 92/74 
Louis PHLIPS
Basing Point Pricing, Competition and 
Market Integration
ECO No. 92/75 
Stephen MARTIN
Economic Efficiency and Concentration: 
Are Mergers a Fitting Response?
ECO No. 92/76
Luisa ZANCHI
The Inter-Industry Wage Structure: 
Empirical Evidence for Germany and a 
Comparison With the U.S. and Sweden
ECO NO. 92/77
Agustin MARA V ALL




Three Tests for the Existence of Cycles 
in Time Series
ECO No. 92/79
Peter J. HAMMOND/Jaime SEMPERE 
Limits to the Potential Gains from Market 
Integration and Other Supply-Side 
Policies
































































































Victor G6MEZ and Agustfn 
MARAVALL
Time Series Regression with ARIMA 
Noise and Missing Observations 
Program TRAM
ECO No. 92/82
J. Bradford DE LONG/ Marco BECHT 
“Excess Volatility” and the German 
Stock Market, 1876-1990
ECO No. 92/83
Alan KIRMAN/Louis PHLIPS 




Migration, Savings and Uncertainty
ECO No. 92/85 
J. Bradford DE LONG 
Productivity Growth and Machinery 
Investment: A Long-Run Look, 1870- 
1980
ECO NO. 92/86
Robert B. BARSKY and J. Bradford
DE LONG









Encompassing Unvariate Models in 
Multivariate Time Series: A Case Study
ECO No. 92/89
Peter J. HAMMOND
Aspects of Rationalizable Behaviour
ECO No. 92/80
Victor G6MEZ and Agusu'n 
MARAVALL
Estimation, Prediction and Interpolation 
for Nonstationary Series with the 
Kalman Filter
Working Paper out of print
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
